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China’s expanding military presence and assertive conduct provoked strong 
concerns among Western nations about the freedom of navigation in the 
South China Sea. United States-led naval operations in contested areas have 
emerged as the preferred countermeasure thereto. However, diverging legal 
positions, complex territorial and maritime disputes, and growing aspira-
tions to enlarged national spheres of influence have resulted in unintended 
outcomes. Recently, a flurry of diplomatic statements and several large-
scale naval exercises have further elevated tensions.
 • A series of controversies over oceanographic surveying and military-surveil-
lance activities in the South China Sea have brought to the fore the long-stand-
ing struggle between coastal states and naval powers as it shaped the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
 • The US and China hold diametrically opposed views on the rights and freedoms 
of warships to navigate through territorial seas and operate in exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZs). While China has been instrumentalising UNCLOS provi-
sions and claims to historic rights as a security-political shield, the US has been 
striving to safeguard its armed forces’ freedom to manoeuver in East Asian seas.
 • China’s attempt to control almost the entire South China Sea and US-led ef-
forts to push back against the former’s generally rising global influence have 
politicised the US Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operations and obscured their 
objectives. Never designed to counter territorial claims, these have come to re-
present “shows of force.”
 • To put a halt to the accelerating militarisation of the South China Sea, the US 
and China need to overcome geopolitical tunnel visions regarding one another. 
Also, all coastal states have to recast their claims in conformity with UNCLOS 
and seek cooperative arrangements as the basis for future settlements.
Policy Implications
European diplomats and defence officials should encourage Southeast Asian 
governments to reduce, delimit, and regulate their overlapping territorial sov-
ereignty, EEZ, and continental shelf claims. Unlike extra-regional powers’ blunt 
shows of force, such an alignment would put pressure on China and further the 
rule of international law. Europe should also encourage the US to ratify UNCLOS 
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The Militarisation of the South China Sea
The militarisation of the South China Sea, an area covering 3.5 million square kilo-
metres and one significantly larger than the Mediterranean Sea, is usually linked to 
China’s fortification of several geographical features of the Spratly Islands group. In 
2014, the Chinese leadership ordered rapid and simultaneous large-scale land rec-
lamations in order to replace makeshift outposts with infrastructure that can house 
battalion-sized military units. Facilitated by three newly built 3,000-metre-long 
runways and several large-scale berths, Chinese authorities also installed surveil-
lance and weapons systems. These developments were paralleled by an increasingly 
assertive Chinese attitude towards the navigation of foreign warships and resource 
exploitation there. In 2016, the decision returned in a Philippines-initiated arbitra-
tion case threw this expansion into stark relief and led to the view that China had 
been challenging the freedom of navigation and working to undermine the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Policymakers and strategists in Washington are particularly concerned about 
Chinese efforts to deter United States aircraft carrier strike groups from operat-
ing in the East and South China Seas. To counter what became known as China’s 
“Anti-Access Area Denial” strategy for controlling the waters west of the Japanese 
Ryukyu Islands and the Philippine archipelago, they designed the “Air-Sea Battle” 
doctrine. Introduced in 2009, it was later renamed the “Joint Concept for Access 
and Maneuver in the Global Commons.” This geopolitical contest had made oceano-
graphic surveying and military surveillance crucially important long before China’s 
recent foray into the Spratlys. Against this background, the heating up of territorial 
disputes in East Asian seas from 2009 onwards has exacerbated anxieties and cast 
a spotlight on the decades-old US Freedom of Navigation programme.
Facing increasing pressure to show resolve, the Barack Obama administration 
ordered a series of calibrated naval operations. It also encouraged others to join 
in defending the freedom of navigation. Australian policymakers refrained from 
expressly challenging Chinese claims through Freedom of Navigation Operations 
(FONOPs) but continued long-standing surveillance activities out of a Malaysian 
airbase. Meanwhile, Japan stepped up its naval diplomacy, including by deploying 
aircraft carriers so as to “send signals” to China. The British and French defence 
ministers, too, pledged to defend the rules-based order by way of exercising the 
 naval freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. At the 2016 Shangri-La Dia-
logue both announced the dispatch of carrier-groups and other warships. More-
over, Japan and India have moved to fortify the Ryukyu island chain in the Western 
Pacific and the Andaman/Nicobar island chain in the Bay of Bengal respectively, as 
they straddle major shipping routes.
This development raises the questions of whether and if so how FONOPs do 
indeed safeguard navigational rights and freedoms and strengthen adherence to 
international law. To answer these, we first describe the legal and political contexts. 
Second, we outline the debate about the effectiveness of FONOPs. Third, we ad-
vance, from a European perspective, policy proposals for strengthening the rule of 
law over the rule of force.
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Debating Navigational Rights and Freedoms
The controversy about navigational rights and freedoms revolves around two main 
issues: freedoms of navigation and overflight in exclusive economic zones (EEZs), 
and foreign warships’ rights to navigate through territorial seas and archipel agic 
waters. Upon concluding decades-long negotiations in 1982, UNCLOS codified 
navi gational regimes to safeguard international navigation. Most importantly, all 
states enjoy freedom of navigation on the high seas and in coastal states’ 200 nau-
tical-mile-wide EEZs. The EEZ was created as a new form of maritime zone so as to 
reconcile coastal states’ insistence on exclusive economic rights and naval powers’ 
insistence on high seas freedoms of navigation. Thus, the EEZ is not a maritime 
zone of sovereignty but one of functionally limited rights and jurisdiction; coastal 
states have to accept the exercise of various high seas freedoms.
In the territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles (NM) from their shores and in 
the internal waters located landwards of the baselines, on the other hand, coastal 
states have sovereignty, limited only in the territorial sea by the relatively restrictive 
right of “innocent passage.” This right allows ships to sail through another state’s 
territorial sea in a “continuous and expeditious” manner that is not “prejudicial to 
the peace, good order or security of the coastal state”. It precludes various activi-
ties such as, for example, operating ship-borne aircraft, research, and surveillance, 
and also requires submarines to surface and show their flag. Innocent passage can 
be suspended under certain strict conditions, and no associated right of overflight 
 exists. Some coastal states insist on prior notification or authorisation for the pas-
sage of foreign warships, but the legality of such practices is doubtful.
Strips of territorial sea that form part of straits used for international naviga-
tion and are located between high seas or EEZs, fall within the more liberal “transit 
passage” regime. This regime was first established by UNCLOS following pressure 
by great powers with ocean-going navies and allows ships – including warships – to 
navigate continuously and expeditiously in their “normal modes of operation.” For 
example, submarines may remain submerged. Unlike innocent passage, the right of 
transit passage cannot be suspended and includes the right of overflight.
Further, following successful lobbying by island nations such as Indonesia and 
the Philippines, a new regime of archipelagic states and archipelagic waters would 
be included in UNCLOS. Archipelagic states may draw archipelagic baselines be-
tween their islands, the waters landwards of which constitute archipelagic waters. 
These archipelagic waters, like the territorial sea, fall within archipelagic states’ 
sovereignty. In these waters, foreign ships enjoy innocent passage as well as “archi-
pelagic sea lanes passage” – which essentially amounts to a somewhat more limited 
form of transit passage (“continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit”). An 
important difference is that archipelagic states may designate archipelagic sea lanes 
for this purpose.
Yet, the practical implementation of these navigational regimes raises many dif-
ficult questions. While the US is a proponent of liberal interpretations, China takes 
very restrictive positions regarding the navigational rights of foreign warships. 
Most developed Western states have traditionally aligned themselves with the US 
interpretation, while many Asian developing countries – including e.g. India – hold 
views that are closer to China’s (Kaye 2008). Although China has by now built up 
the world’s second most powerful naval force, its stance remains reminiscent of 
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an insecure developing country. Like many other coastal states, China strives to 
use international law – including UNCLOS – to expand its maritime rights and 
jurisdiction, and to establish control over adjacent maritime spaces and re sources. 
Unlike other powers with ocean-going navies and similar to other developing coast-
al states, however, it also seeks to restrict the movement of foreign warships by 
stretching legal interpretations beyond UNCLOS provisions.
China not only generously draws straight baselines in order to enlarge its ter-
ritorial seas and extend its other maritime zones farther into the high seas; it also 
adopts expansive interpretations of the “island” concept, arguing that these may 
serve as the basis for EEZ claims. In its territorial seas, China insists that foreign 
warships obtain prior authorisation before exercising their right of innocent pas-
sage. China also maintains that surveillance and oceanographic surveying, crucial 
for the operations of naval forces, require prior authorisation in its EEZs. Attempts 
to enforce this view have seriously damaged relations with the US. A Chinese fighter 
jet’s mid-air collision with a US EP-3 type surveillance plane in April 2001 and 
Chinese government vessels, trawlers, and airplanes obstructing operations of the 
oceanographic survey vessel USNS Impeccable in March 2009 are well-known ex-
amples hereof. Recurring confrontations of this kind have been the decisive factor 
in shaping antagonistic security policies and cannot be underestimated.
The fact that China, together with Taiwan, claims most of the South China Sea 
only exacerbates this problem. To be sure, Chinese authorities have never clari-
fied their claims in the legal terms of UNCLOS. Over the last decade, however, the 
debate about the meaning of the so-called nine-dash line that encompasses almost 
the entire South China Sea has ultimately evolved to the position that everything 
within belongs to China (Gao and Jia 2013). Chinese leaders have long been anxious 
about foreign intervention in a Taiwan Strait contingency and the possibility that 
the powerful US Navy and its allies could strangle the Chinese economy by disrupt-
ing energy and trade flows through Southeast Asian seas – especially the “choke 
point” of the Malacca Straits. Hence, China’s control over the South China Sea has 
been treated as a non-negotiable “core interest” since 2011.
This portrayal mirrors former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s declaration 
at the July 2010 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum 
meeting that the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea constituted a US 
“national interest.” For US policymakers, coastal states’ drive to expand territor-
ial control coupled with the generally advancing regulation of the seas for eco-
nomic, envir onmental, and other purposes, known as “creeping jurisdiction,” has 
been a long-standing concern (Wilson and Kraska 2009). They fear that pertaining 
 UNCLOS norms will impose restrictions on US naval vessels and aircraft operating 
in the “global commons.”
In essence, China and the US hold opposing views on the very nature of the EEZ 
as an extension of sovereign rights from the land into the sea, or as an extension of 
high seas freedoms toward the coast, respectively (Bateman 2020). Accordingly, the 
US argument that oceanographic surveillance and military surveying are permis-
sible in EEZs as long as the obtained data serves military purposes only strikes the 
wrong chord in Beijing. Yet, the US is in an awkward position in relying on UNCLOS 
regardless. It has not yet ratified the Convention, and instead claims that most of its 
provisions reflect customary international law.
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Debating Freedom of Navigation Operations
To counter creeping jurisdiction, the US in 1979 initiated the Freedom of Navi-
gation Program. It consists of bilateral and multilateral consultations, diplomatic 
representations, and operational assertions by government vessels and aircraft dir-
ected at perceived excessive claims by individual coastal states – allies and rivals 
alike. Since 2009 drastically rising tensions over the South China Sea, however, 
have altered the overall context and stirred debates about the FONOPs’ legal effec-
tiveness, political nature, and relationship to broader geopolitical objectives.
Under President Obama, the US labelled one naval operation in 2013, two in 
2015, and three in 2016 as South China Sea FONOPs. Under President Donald 
Trump, meanwhile, the US Navy conducted six FONOPs there in 2017, five in 2018, 
seven in 2019, and five in 2020 as of the time of writing in August of that year. 
In addition, surveillance aircraft and long-range bombers have been asserting the 
freedom of overflight.
Officially, FONOPs serve a legal purpose. However, given the above-mentioned 
developments, naval assertions invariably became tools in regional politics and for 
global geopolitical strategizing. By their very nature, the narrow, technically sophis-
ticated, and inherently competing legal arguments of the involved states have been 
appropriated for parochial political purposes and assimilated into grand geopoliti-
cal narratives. For a number of reasons, it has not always been clear what coastal 
state practices exactly FONOPs in the South China Sea are even meant to protest. 
First, China – similar to other coastal states – has intentionally remained ambigu-
ous about its claims, making it difficult to identify clear targets vis-à-vis legal as-
sertions. Second, the arbitrators in the 2016 Philippines versus China case found 
that none of the South China Sea’s disputed geographic features can generate EEZs 
and that many are low-tide elevations that are not even entitled to a territorial sea. 
Third, neither politics nor law is governed by objective truths. Perceptions matter. 
Therefore, the outcomes of FONOPs often diverge considerably from intended ef-
fects. Ostensibly designed to further the rule of law over the rule of force, they ap-
pear as mere tools of “lawfare” – a term coined to capture the instrumentalization of 
law for furthering parochial political interests, including military objectives.
Apart from the fundamental differences between China and the US over per-
missible oceanographic surveying and military surveillance in EEZs, several op-
erational assertions have been legally unsound. For instance, the reported passage 
of the destroyer USS Lassen “within 12 NM” of Subi Reef in October 2015 could be 
seen as unintentionally reinforcing China’s dubious potential claim to a territorial 
sea around this low-tide elevation (LaGrone 2015). A further example of unclear 
messaging is the USS Dewey’s operation “within 12 NM” of Mischief Reef, another 
low-tide elevation that cannot create a 12 NM territorial sea of its own (Dutton and 
Kardon 2017).
A lack of transparency complicates FONOPs’ effectiveness in countering Chi-
na’s excessive claims legally and politically, too. As a general rule, US authorities, 
like their British and French counterparts, provide no legal and operational details. 
Yet, partial information such as the name of the ship involved and the geographical 
feature in question deliberately transpires through the US media or official Chinese 
protests. Only in cases where the Chinese air force, navy, coastguard, or fishermen 
militia stage aggressive resistance will details be disclosed. Thus, what emerges in 
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the public domain is not arguments that could coalesce into a legal consensus but 
rather recurring episodes of only confrontational rhetoric and provocative behav-
iour. Seemingly, both US and Chinese decision-makers find it difficult to overcome 
political and legal situations that they perceive as undesirable without inadvertently 
emphasising them.
The problem of distinguishing protest against creeping jurisdiction from objec-
tions to expansive territorial claims further politicises FONOPs. Successive US ad-
ministrations have made clear that they remain neutral in sovereignty disputes and 
merely insist on non-coercive settlements. However, China’s maritime claims in the 
South China Sea mostly rely on the premise of territorial sovereignty over claimed 
features as well as the legal status of the latter. Thus, politics trumps law because 
China’s expansive territorial claims inevitably make the country the principal target 
of FONOPs. Additionally, China’s many rivals such as the US, Japan, and India use 
the freedom of navigation argument to rally international support against the Mid-
dle Kingdom’s attempts to restore imperial reach. Not least, UNCLOS and the South 
China Sea quagmire are too complex to be explained in news cycles. The further 
militarisation of the maritime sphere is the consequence. Therefore, experts at the 
US Naval War College recommend the separation of the global FONOPs programme 
against creeping jurisdiction from concerns over the freedom of navigation in the 
South China Sea – and so simply “just fly, sail and operate wherever international 
law allows” (Dutton and Kardon 2017).
Towards Greater Sophistication or Escalation?
For this policy change to happen, two specific issues need to be addressed. First, 
China’s aggressive assertion of vast territorial and maritime claims demands more 
sophisticated responses if the US wants to remain credible in the eyes of its East Asian 
allies and partners. As much as they satisfy impulses to “do something,” FONOPs and 
other “shows of force” remain ineffective in genuinely countering China’s subtle 
“salami-slicing” or “grey zone” tactics. On the contrary, shows of force fuel ten-
sions. Aside from making Chinese leaders ever more determined to defend their 
core interests at all costs, they also heighten general insecurity and increase East 
Asian allies’ demands for US reassurances even further (Cooper and Poling 2019).
Second, the framing of the freedom of navigation for (US) warships as a geo-
political problem inevitably caused by China’s rise upends ostensible efforts to 
strengthen the rule of law over the rule of force. This geopolitical lens mandates 
the intensification of balancing through military means. It not only elevates the 
use of military force to the only effective course of action, but also reduces the is-
sue to one of Sino–US superpower competition. Both the US and Chinese poles get 
 strengthened militarily. While the Communist Party of China has long viewed every 
aspect of political and social life through the lens of regime security, the US govern-
ment – especially under the Trump administration – has come to see the actions 
taken by China and Chinese individuals as potential threats. Very few issues remain 
outside the purview of national security politics.
This trend could be reversed if the US tailored its response to China’s territorial 
and maritime expansion to the disputes’ specifics, and only moved in lockstep with 
the concerned East Asian partners as long as these adhere to UNCLOS. A series of 
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diplomatic statements may indicate such a policy change being underway. In a June 
2020 note verbale to the United Nations and a July 2020 statement by Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo, the US reiterated and clarified somewhat its position on the 
legal nature of specific geological features. Thus, despite formally remaining neu-
tral on territorial disputes the US in fact appears to side with the arbitrators in the 
aforementioned Philippines versus China case. In light of the Trump administra-
tion’s “whole of government” approach to curtailing China’s perceived global influ-
ence as well as of the enhanced US naval presence in contested areas of the South 
China Sea, this might just be an escalatory act of lawfare. Yet, related diplomatic 
interventions by Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and 
Vietnam could also promote solutions based on the law of the sea.
In any case for this strategy to successfully de-escalate the situation and further 
the rule of law it will first be necessary to sort out the disputes’ intra-Southeast 
Asian dimensions. This can work if the concern about the freedom of navigation is 
separated from that of disputes about territorial sovereignty and maritime delimi-
tation, and if both issues are separated from broader geopolitical objectives. Thus, 
the law of the sea as applied in the Philippines versus China arbitration can be use-
ful for overcoming the quagmire by, first, aligning Southeast Asian governments’ 
positions and by, second, giving China the choice to either join in or face a united 
opposition.
Europe’s Role in Strengthening the Rule of the Law of the Sea
Interestingly, those Southeast Asian states who would be most affected by the inter-
ruption of maritime transport are more concerned with issues of sovereignty and 
marine resources than with ones of sea-lane security and navigational rights and 
freedoms. External powers such as Australia and the US, in contrast, exaggerate 
their economic dependencies on trade via the South China Sea – much of which is 
to and from China – and conflate it with the freedom of navigation for their war-
ships (RSIS 2017). This situation points to the underlying geopolitics driving the 
ongoing lawfare. Thus, the solution for demilitarising the South China Sea lies in 
the coastal states of Southeast Asia, who harbour no geopolitical ambitions of their 
own, to take the lead. It is in their interests to defer to UNCLOS for preserving dip-
lomatic and security-political space in the face of intensifying great power rivalry. 
An ASEAN leaders’ statement of June 2020 testifies to this, in that it reaffirmed the 
importance of “upholding international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS, in the 
South China Sea” while also stressing the significance of “non-militarisation and 
self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes 
and affect peace and stability” (ASEAN 2020: 4).
This insight leads to three policy recommendations. First, conscious of the 
complex political relations within East Asia and between China on the one hand and 
the US and its allies on the other, European policymakers should resist the tempta-
tion to stage naval shows of force. These are not only mere shows, but furthermore 
create the impression – also in Southeast Asian eyes – that Europeans think of 
themselves as being on the side of the law simply because of being European and 
militarily powerful. While such shows may cover for policymakers’ lack of better 
ideas, extra-regional actors’ uninvited FONOPs inevitably raise the question of hid-
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den geopolitical motives. Unlike Australia, which mostly continues long-standing 
practice, a new emphasis on a European military presence in the South China Sea 
that goes beyond standard naval diplomacy almost certainly contributes to the es-
calatory spiral. If Europe was to insert itself in the Sino–US geopolitical contest for 
primacy there, it would neither end Chinese assertiveness nor see East Asia or the 
Indo-Pacific become more stable. Therefore, European participation in exercises at 
sea should be limited to cases where Southeast Asian states – who pursue defensive 
policies – take the lead.
Second, European policymakers should encourage primarily Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia to formulate their maritime claims in conformity with 
 UNCLOS. This requires unilateral action such as the modification and clarification 
of existing claims and the establishment of coherent national policies and regula-
tions – steps that experts in the Philippines and Vietnam have begun to ponder 
(McDorman 2017). These steps need to be complemented with bilateral and mini-
lateral agreements (Laksmana and Waffaa 2020), including delimitation and sec-
tor al cooperation arrangements. The outcomes of the 2016 Philippines–China arbi-
tration case – especially the denial of China’s historic rights argument, the narrow 
definition of most disputed features as low-tide elevations or rocks, and the em-
phasis on coastal states’ responsibilities to protect the marine environment – can 
provide a helpful frame of reference to this end. The ASEAN leaders’ statement of 
June 2020 is a first rhetorical step in this direction. In addition, in July 2020 the 
government of President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines seemed to abandon its 
previous conciliatory attitude and expressly asked China to comply with the 2016 
decision of the arbitral tribunal. Given past experiences with formal dispute-set-
tlement mechanisms, Southeast Asian states could also consider the initiation of 
further arbitration proceedings under UNCLOS. In any case, future agreements and 
arrangements must leave openings for China and Taiwan to join in or participate. At 
the same time European policymakers must bear in mind that parts of the arbitral 
award – including its very broad interpretation of the tribunal’s jurisdiction and 
its unexpectedly narrow conception of “islands” that possess an EEZ or continental 
shelf of their own – remain controversial among experts and governments around 
the world. Also, European leaders and experts should confront the US Senate with 
the fact that its continued refusal to ratify UNCLOS weakens the US’s position – 
and, indeed, the treaty as a whole.
Third and finally, European policymakers should encourage the US and China 
to continue serious negotiations over military activities off their respective shores. 
These need to go beyond the mere exchange of EEZ-related legal interpretations 
and focus on major political questions. Unless the two find a political compromise, 
tensions will continue to rise and spread. Once the Chinese Navy starts to push back 
against US activities in the northern part of the South China Sea and extends its 
surveillance operations (like those it sometimes conducts around Japan) to include 
areas off US and allied naval bases, it will not only reveal its double standards on the 
legality of military-related surveying and surveillance in EEZ. Although the US gov-
ernment has in the past accepted these activities as lawful, political commentators’ 
reactions to Chinese vessels observing allied exercises off Alaska, Australia, and 
Hawaii suggest that such a policy change will also trigger even stronger responses 
in the US, in allied capitals, and beyond, thereby furthering the militarisation of 
the seas.
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Europe would serve itself, the East Asian region, and the wider international 
community best if it provided an alternative to advancing polarisation and militari-
sation. A clear focus on international law, rather than on lawfare, will not only help 
to align Southeast Asian positions, but also preclude tensions between European 
Union member states whose national interests in the Indo-Pacific may not be one 
and the same.
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